A Refutation of the Monergism of Gordon H. Clark’s book “God and Evil, The Problem Solved”
By Steve Morrison Sept. 17, 2023 version
One way to classify Calvinistic Christians is synergists vs. monergists. Synergists, which include non-Calvinist Christians too, believe there is an interaction between God’s grace and human freedom through faith. Monergists, on the other hand, say there is no interaction, nor any needed, between God’s grace and anything else; Monergists believe we have no free will; it is totally controlled. Every single thing happens because it was God’s pleasure to decree every single thing, both wicked and good.
A consequence of monergism is that the issue of why God allows evil becomes so simple: God actually decreed every single sin because He wanted the evil, or as some put it, it is in His good pleasure.
Does monergism make everyone, even Satan and demons, mere puppets who will be thrown into the Lake of Fire because they pleased God in what God forced their will to choose? Synergists might say it is obvious that it does, but Clark gives a couple of answers as to why we are not puppets. We will look those in a bit.
So the key question in this paper is which is true:
God decreed every sin because He wanted to
vs.
People can choose what God did not delight in. Luke 7:30; Jonah 2:8; Isaiah 66:4; Jeremah 19:5-6; 32:35
This is not a small issue. Because of his monergistic theology, Clark was not a part of the Presbyterian Church of America (PCA).
Gordon H. Clark believes he has “the problem solved” to answer the question of how God allows evil. We are going to look at the shortcomings of his attempted solution and its ramifications. We will show why his shallow solution is consistent with many scriptures. Then we will present a solution consistent with scripture.
Clark spends considerable ink saying he is not alone in his view. While I have not read many Calvinists who would agree with him, Arthur W. Pink, John Owen, and the Baptist John Gill would. Also, only an estimated 5% of Calvinists are supralapsarian, and Clark, Pink, and Gill are supralapsarian, in that they believe God’s decrees to save some and condemn others was antecedent to the decree of the fall. John Owen taught there was enough wriggle room in scripture that you cannot say for certain.
Here is what A.W. Pink says in The Sovereignty of God p.194. “To put it now in its strongest form, we insist that God does as He Pleases, only as He pleases, always as He pleases; that whatever takes place in time is but the outworking of that which He decreed in eternity.”
“...not only had God a perfect foreknowledge of the outcome of Adam’s trial, not only did His omniscient eye see Adam eating of the forbidden fruit, but He decreed beforehand that he should do so. This is evident not only from the general fact that nothing happens save that which the Creator and governor of the universe has eternally purposed, but also from the express declaration of Scripture that Christ as a Lamb ‘verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world’ (1 Pet 1:20).” (A.W. Pink The Sovereignty of God p.249. italics in original)
As supralapsarian Theodora Beza put it, “The fall of man was both necessary and wonderful.”
Multiple Definitions of Free Will
There are multiple ways people define free-will.
Unscriptural: Many Calvinists define free will as totally free decisions and actions people can do, independent of the sovereignty and control of God. Thus, if free will exists, by this definition, then God is not really sovereign over the universe. All Calvinists are against free will by this definition. All Christians should be too!. However, there are only two groups I know that have this definition of free will. Followers of an extreme theology called Process Theology/Finite Godism, and some Calvinists themselves, when they want to highlight what they are against.
Scriptural: Most Christians, including the early Christians used the term to refer to decisions and actions God has given us responsibility for. We are guilty for the wrong choices we make. God neither coerced our actions nor our will, but God knew in advance what we would do, and even uses our choices as a part of His plan. Many Calvinists would agree with this, except they would call this free agency, to differentiate it from the first definition. However, the early Christians always used the term “free will” for this definition. Luke 7:30; Matthew 23:37; Jonah 2:8; and other passages show that people can make choices they have responsibility for. In other words, these chose things against God’s good pleasure, as Jeremiah 19:5-6; 32:35 prove.
One final note: just how “free” is our free will/free agency? Given that we only have freedom within the limits and time that God’s decreed to permit our freedom, it is not completely free. Also, given that people are fallen beings, apart from Christ a person’s “free” will is actually in bondage to sin. So when this paper mentions free will or free agency, it should be understood that “free” is not completely free, but “free” in a limited, relative sense. But we are still free enough to justly bear responsibility for our free will.
Clark’s Example: A Man Shooting His Family
As Gordon H. Clark forthrightly declares, his answer is “determinism” (p.18): people have no free will. As a clear example, he says on p.27: “I wish very frankly and pointedly to assert that if a man gets drunk and shoots his family, it was the will of God that he should do so. The Scriptures leave no room for doubt, as was made plain before, that it was God’s will for Herod, Pilate, and the Jews to crucify Christ. In Ephesians 1:11 Paul tells us that God works all things, not some things only, after the council of his own will.”
Let’s look at the logical consequences of Clark’s clear example of a hypothetical drunk man shooting his family. When I say “God wanted it” I don’t mean God told Him to do it. Rather, God in His decreed will wanted it, and God made the man do it.
Why did the man do it? God wanted it.
Could the man have done otherwise? No, because God wanted it.
Could the family have persuaded him, or run fast enough to escape being murdered? No, because God did not want them to escape.
Could the man have done, even wanted to do, anything at all different? No, because the man will do exactly all that God wants and is not capable of even willing, much less doing, anything else.
Let’s take Clark’s example a little further. Sooner or later that man, let’s call him “Jim”, dies and stands before God. He rejected Jesus his entire life, and God sends Him to Hell. But right before the man is sent to Hell, he asks God permission to ask a few questions, and God agrees. God’s answers are in italics. Now I don’t really believe myself that God would say these things, so let’s says this is “M God”
Jim: I loved my family; why did I drunkenly shoot them?
M God: I made you do choose to do that.
Jim: Why did you create me to shoot my family?
M God: It was just my good pleasure that I wanted you to do that.
Jim: Was there any way I could have avoided shooting my family?
M God: No, I made sure there was no way you could avoid shooting your family, because I wanted you to shoot them.
Jim: Did I have any control at all over the situation?
M God: People delude themselves that they have at least a tiny bit of control over if something happens or not, but no, people have no control over anything. If anyone had any free ability to affect anything, then I would not be Sovereign God.
Jim: Why did you “coerce” me to be evil?
M God: I did not coerce you; I did not force you to do anything against your will. Rather, I forced your will to be that way. I simply made it where you had to be evil. I did it because I wanted to.
Jim: Why are you sending me to Hell, for doing something you wanted to decree me to do and I could not have changed?
M God: Because I made you to do evil things, and I just wanted to create you to suffer for eternity for things, to punish you for what I forced your will to choose.
Jim: Is it really my fault I am being sent to Hell, or your fault?
M God: I am not saying it is your fault for My making you do evil; I am saying I am blaming you.
Thus, per Clark, the problem of evil is all solved. Evil is not going against God’s decreed will, because nothing goes against God’s decreed will. Evil, in this scenario is when God’s commanded will differs from His decreed will. Why do people do evil? – because the M God made them do evil because He wanted them to.
So in Clark’s view of evil, it is similar to good, in that both are “that which God wanted to make us choose to do.”
Most Christians would say, “But this is not scriptural!” In many places, such as Ezekiel 8:6,17, people do things that not merely sadden or disappoint God, but provoke God to wrath. But if Clark is correct, why would God be so angry about what God made them do? In fact, why would God ever by angry about anything at all, since it is His good pleasure to decree it? It is sort of like locking your dog in a small closet for a few days, and then punishing your dog for using the bathroom in the closet. The ramifications of Clark’s view are not consistent with Ezekiel 8:6,17 and other passages.
Clark is aware of the charge that this reduces us to just puppets. The following quote is rather long, but it is necessary to fairly understand Clark’s response on p.28-29.
“The major point [against Stuart C. Hackett], however is that Calvinism is supposed to reduce men to puppets.
Such an objection could arise only upon an ignorance of Puritan writings. Perhaps the objector has seen a chapter in the Westminster Confession “On Free Will”; or he may have read the Shorter Catechism that our first parents were left to the freedom of their own wills; then, without reading the literature of that day, he assumes that official Calvinism is more moderate than the view defended here, and that a denial of free will is hyper-Calvinism. A creed, however, is not a detailed philosophic treatise, and its phrases must be understood in the sense in which the authors mean them. If this meaning is not clear from the creedal context itself, it must be sought in the literature. Now, the Westminster Confession indeed speaks of the natural liberty of man’s will. These phrases could seem to be accommodations to the theory of free will, but they can seem so only because the meaning of the phrase ‘absolute necessity of nature’ has been mistaken.”
Clark is trying to say that despite superficial phrasing, the Westminster Confession and other Puritan writings did not really teach free will. While it might be interesting what various Puritans believed about free will, that is not relevant here; the only subject at hand is what Clark and Monergists believe. Clark points out that some Calvinists (mistakenly in his opinion) speak of free will. That is true too, but the subject at hand is Clark’s view.
So I object to Clark laying the groundwork that all of our wills are just puppets, and then hiding behind Puritans and other historical Calvinists that they taught we are not puppets. I am not interested in what they taught here; I am only interested in what Clark and Monergists believe and teach.
So in his first answer I don’t believe that Clark addressed the question, except to say that others believed like him. But Clark does address the question in his next answer, given on pp.31-32,35. Clark says that we are not puppets because puppets have no will, while people (as well as angels and demons) have will; it is just not free will. But Clark never says we have any more freedom or choice than puppets. So we are not puppets; our will is a puppet.
A puppet or doll with a voicebox and a string can even speak. But we know it is not really choosing to speak; it is just speaking when someone pulls the string. If our will is as much controlled by God as the rest of us, then we are still just puppets with a voicebox and a string for a will.
God did not coerce them, but God made their will want to. Why do people break God’s commanded will; ultimately only for one reason: God in His decreed will desired that they disobey Him.
Joshua 24:14-15 says, “Now, therefore, fear the LORD and serve Him in sincerity and truth; cast aside the gods your fathers served beyond the Euphrates and in Egypt, and serve the LORD. 15 But if it is unpleasing in your sight to serve the LORD, then choose for yourselves this day whom you will serve, whether the gods your fathers served beyond the Euphrates, or the gods of the Amorites in whose land you are living. As for me and my house, we will serve the LORD!” (Berean Study bible)
Joshua 24:22-24 “Then Joshua told them, ‘You are witnesses against yourselves that you have chosen to serve the LORD.’ ‘We are witnesses!’ they said. ‘Now, therefore,’ he said, ‘get rid of the foreign gods among you and incline your hearts to the LORD, the God of Israel.’ So the people said to Joshua, ‘We will serve the LORD our God and obey His voice.’”
So the people were commanded to make a choice, then scripture says the people made a choice, and were held responsible for the choice they made. Some Calvinists might say that the only choice the reprobate Israelites could make in Joshua 24:15 was which idols to serve. That was not true, since they did choose to serve the Lord here. But even if what some Calvinists say were true, still this would be their choice, which would go against Monergism, because their will was not a puppet.
Either their will has some freedom, or else their will has no freedom. If you believe that their will had some freedom, then, by my understanding, you cannot be a monergist like Clark.
If you believe that our will has some degree of freedom, and yet God is sovereign over everything, at every level, how do God’s permissive decrees preserve both God’s sovereignty and some degree of free agency for us? We have to turn to scripture to answer that.
While Gordon H. Clark’s effort to answer the problem of evil feels lacking to most Christians, we can agree that we should not judge an answer based on our degree of comfort or discomfort with it. We have to compare it with Scripture.
Now, I don’t think Clark is completely wrong on everything. Clark and I would agree that God knows for certain everything that happens in the future (Psalm 139:16), and nothing happens except that God allows (Job 1:2; James 4:15). God is the source of all good and the definition of good (~Mark 10:18). We also agree that God works all things according to the counsel of His will (Ephesians 1:11; Proverbs 16:4,33; Romans 8:28; 11:36). God can do as He pleases; He directly controls every event that He desires (Isaiah 14:24,27; 43:13; 55:11; John 10:26; Hebrews 6:17). I will even go so far as to say that God could make us puppets and control every little detail if He so desired. But we strongly disagree on whether God controls every little detail, which means we disagree on whether God wants evil things, whether secretly or not.
We agree that God’s will has both a revealed part and a secret part. As the Calvinist Francis Shaeffer insightfully said in The Church at the End of the Twentieth Century: “We can glorify God, and both the Old and New Testament say that we can even make God sad. That is tremendous.” (Hymns for the People of God no.364.). Shaeffer was no monergist.
Ultimately, does everything happen because God wanted to make it happen, or is Francis Shaeffer right, that some things can sadden God? Scripture answers that by showing us that some things break God’s heart: Luke 19:41-44; Matthew 23:37-39; Jeremiah 4:19-22; 9:1.
Can anyone do something that God did not make their will want to do? In other words, at least within limits and for a time, will God allow someone to do something that He chose to decree only in a permissive sense? Scripture says “yes”, according to Acts 7:39; 51; 4:11; 13:46; 14:2; 2 Corinthians 6.1. Furthermore, a believer can even do some good things on their own initiative, according to 2 Corinthians 8:19.even some good things a believe can do on their own initiative, according to 2 Corinthians 8:17.
God has NOT chosen to directly and expressly control some events to happen as He desires, as shown in Jeremiah 5:29; 8:19; 12:8; 19:5; 32:35; Ezekiel 8:6.
Jeremiah 19:5-6 says, “and have built the high places of Baal to burn their children in the fire for burnt offerings to Baal, which I didn’t command, nor speak, which didn’t even enter into my mind. Therefore, behold, the days come,” says Yahweh, “that this place will no more be called ‘Topheth’, nor ‘The Valley of the son of Hinnom’, but ‘The valley of Slaughter’.” (WEB) Jeremiah 32:35 says something similar.
Clark’s answer is a type of “monergism”. A more scriptural approach is called “synergism”; in other words, there is an interaction between God and people. God made our will to be MORE than just a puppet.
Jeremiah 18:5 strongly implies interaction, or “synergism” as opposed to “monergism”. Then Yahweh’s word came to me, saying, “House of Israel, can’t I do with you as this potter?” says Yahweh. “Behold, as the clay in the potter’s hand, so are you in my hand, house of Israel. At the instant I speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up and to break down and to destroy it, if that nation, concerning which I have spoken, turns from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do to them. At the instant I speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to build and to plant it, if they do that which is evil in my sight, that they not obey my voice, then I will repent of the good with which I said I would benefit them. (WEB)
Monergists such as Gordon Clark and A.W. Pink believe that God decreed every sin, because He wanted to. They deny that God is the author or cause of sin, and they say God’s desire for us to sin was in His secret will, not His revealed will. Nevertheless, they teach that God decreed every sin because He wanted to.
Synergists say that God did not decree sin and hates sin. But God allowed some sin for the greater good, and God weaves all things, even sin, as part of His plan.
There are too many scriptures to list that show that we can please God (i.e. give God emotions of pleasure), while others things can displease God or make him angry. You might think there is no way anyone could even try to answer all of those. But you would be mistaken, because many Monergists do, because they do not believe God has any emotions. They believe that all the deep feelings God expresses in all those scriptures can be ignored as just accommodations so that we could feel we related to God better. This view is called anthropopathism, and that is the topic of the next paper.
“Likewise the Spirit also helps in our weaknesses. For we do not know what we should pray for as we ought, but the Spirit Himself makes intercession for us with groaning which cannot be uttered.” (NKJV)
If the Spirit is not suffering from physical discomfort, then why is the Spirit groaning, if He has no emotions at all?
Let’s reanalyze Clark’s example, as what the God would say based on the Bible.
Why did the man do it? The man freely chose to do so, and God in his sovereignty permitted what He did not want.
Could the man have done otherwise? Yes, at that time he could have; God permitted the man’s choice. However, eternally, God knew for certain that the man would do that.
Could the family have persuaded him or run fast enough to escape being murdered? Perhaps, at that time, because they have their free will too, and our free wills interact when we communicate. However, once they were dead, then no. Eternally, God knew for certain what would happen.
Could the man have done, even wanted to do, anything at all different? Yes, and it is his own fault that he did not.
Jim: I loved my family; why did I drunkenly shoot them?
God: It was your own fault. You not only abused your free will; you took away their choice to life, too. (See Jonah 2:8f)
Jim: Why did you create me to shoot my family?
God: I created you to be a godly man. You yourself bear the responsibility for rejecting My plan for you (Luke 7:31)
Jim: Was there any way I could have avoided shooting my family?
God: Yes. You could have not gotten drunk, not bought the gun, and not wanted to shoot them. It was all your fault.
Jim: Did I have any control at all over the situation?
God: People delude themselves into thinking that others or circumstances forced them to do something. However, within My sovereignty, I have delegated some freedom to you, and given the degree of control I allowed you to have within My sovereignty, you used that gift for evil.
Jim: Why did you “coerce” me to be evil?
God: Nobody coerced you; you did that yourself and have only yourself to blame.
Jim: Why are you sending me to Hell, for doing something you wanted to decree me to do and I could not have changed?
God: Though you do not choose to go to Hell now, you are going where the consequences of your choices are sending you. You could have changed it. The fact that I knew beforehand what you would do did not force you to do it.
Jim: Is it really my fault I am being sent to Hell, or your fault?
God: Yes, it is all your fault, and no fault of Mine.
This is from John Gill’s Commentary on Matthew. Matthew 23:37. I apologize for such a long quote, but I wanted to ensure that I captured 100% of the content and tone. Mixed in with many true things, is a very serious theological error added subtly.
- - - - - - -
How often would I have gathered thy children
together, as a hen
gathereth her chickens under
her wings, and ye would not!
Christ
here speaks as a man, and the minister of the circumcision, and expresses an
human affection for the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and an human wish, and will
for their temporal good; which he very aptly signifies by the hen, which is a
very affectionate creature to its young, and which it endeavours to screen from
danger, by covering with its wings. …
Our Lord is to be understood not of his divine will, as God, to gather the people of the Jews internally, by his Spirit and grace, to himself; for all those whom Christ would gather, in this sense, were gathered, notwithstanding all the opposition made by the rulers of the people; but of his human affection and will, as a man, and a minister, to gather them to him externally, by, and under the ministry of his word, to hear him preach; so as that they might be brought to a conviction of, and an assent unto him as the Messiah; which, though it might fall short of faith in him, would have been sufficient to have preserved them from temporal ruin, threatened to their city and temple, in the following verse. Instances of the human affection, and will of Christ, may be observed in (Mark 10:21) (Luke 19:41; Luke 22:42) which will of his, though not contrary to the divine will, but subordinate to it, yet not always the same with it, nor always fulfilled: whereas his divine will, or his will as God, is, always fulfilled: "who hath resisted his will?" this cannot be hindered, and made void; he does whatsoever he pleases: and further, that this will of Christ to gather the Jews to himself, is to be understood of his human, and not divine will, is manifest from hence, that this will was in him, and expressed by him at certain several times, by intervals; and therefore he says, "how often would I have gathered", &c. whereas the divine will is one continued, invariable, and unchangeable will, is always the same, and never begins or ceases to be, and to which such an expression is inapplicable; and therefore these words do not contradict the absolute and sovereign will of God, in the distinguishing acts of it, respecting the choice of some persons, and the leaving of others. And it is to be observed, that the persons whom Christ would have gathered, are not represented as being unwilling to be gathered; but their rulers were not willing that they should, and be made proselytes to him, and come under his wings. It is not said, "how often would I have gathered you, and you would not!" nor, "I would have gathered Jerusalem, and she would not"; nor, "I would have gathered thy children, and they would not"; but, "how often would I have gathered thy children, and ye would not!" Which observation alone is sufficient to destroy the argument founded on this passage in favour of free will. Had Christ expressed his desire to have gathered the heads of the people to him, the members of the Jewish sanhedrim, the civil and ecclesiastical rulers of the Jews: or had he signified how much he wished, and earnestly sought after, and attempted to gather Jerusalem, the children, the inhabitants of it in common, and neither of them would not; it would have carried some appearance of the doctrine of free will, and have seemed to have countenanced it, and have imputed the non-gathering of them to their own will: though had it been said, "they would not", instead of, "ye would not", it would only have furnished out a most sad instance of the perverseness of the will of man, which often opposes his temporal, as well as his spiritual good; and would rather show it to be a slave to that which is evil, than free to that which is good; and would be a proof of this, not in a single person only, but in a body of men. The opposition and resistance to the will of Christ were not made by the people, but by their governors. The common people seemed inclined to attend his ministry, as appears from the vast crowds, which, at different times and places, followed him; but the chief priests, and rulers, did all they could to hinder the collection of them to him, and their belief in him as the Messiah; by traducing his character, miracles, and doctrines, and by menacing the people with curses, and excommunications, making a law, that whoever confessed him should be turned out of the synagogue. So that the plain meaning of the text is the same with that of (Matthew 23:13) and consequently is no proof of men's resisting the operations of the Spirit and grace of God; but only shows what obstructions and discouragements were thrown in the way of attendance on the external ministry of the word. In order to set aside, and overthrow the doctrine of grace, in election, and particular redemption, and effectual calling, it should be proved that Christ, as God, would have gathered, not Jerusalem, and the inhabitants of it only, but all mankind, even such as are not eventually saved, and that in a spiritual, saving way and manner, to himself; of which there is not the least intimation in this text: and in order to establish the resistibility of the grace of God, by the perverse will of man, so as to become of no effect; it should be shown that Christ would have savingly converted persons, and they would not be converted; and that he bestowed the same grace upon them, he does bestow on others, who are converted: whereas the sum of this passage lies in these few words, that Christ, as man, out of a compassionate regard for the people of the Jews, to whom, he was sent as the minister of the circumcision, would have gathered them together under his ministry, and have instructed them in the knowledge of himself, as the Messiah; which if they had only notionally received, would have secured them, as chickens under the hen, from impending judgments, which afterwards fell upon them; but their governors, and not they, would not; that is, would not suffer them to receive him, and embrace him as the Messiah. So that from the whole it appears, that this passage of Scripture, so much talked of by the Arminians, and so often cited by them, has nothing to do with the controversy about the doctrines of election and reprobation, particular redemption, efficacious grace in conversion, and the power of man's free will. This observation alone is sufficient to destroy the argument founded on this passage, in favour of free will.
- - - - - - -
There is a serious problem with this though. While the wills of the Father and Son are distinct, as Matthew 26:39; Mark 14:36; and Luke 22:42 show, John Gill (like Nestorians) are wrong to think that Jesus Christ has two wills in one Being. When John Gill writes, “Our Lord is to be understood not of his divine will as God, … but of his human affection and will, as a man…” Clark “solves” the objection of Matthew 23:37 here by introducing an ancient error of Nestorianism.
A second problem is Gill’s “obfuscating”. Why would Jesus not care about their eternal well-being and instead be more concerned about their temporal well-being? Why would God the Son be more concerned about the fate of their city with no lamenting of the individual people? Gill is trying to cast this passage as only about the temporal well-being of the city. But Gill is obfuscating the point of monergism, that God has decreed every single thing. Then the temporal well-being of the city is every bit as much fully decreed as the eternal well-being of every single person.
A third problem is when Gill says this passage offers “no proof of men’s resistance to the operations of the Spirit and the grace of God”, Jerusalem (and thus its rulers) resisted the operations of the Spirit and the grace of God. There is not a big distinction here. This verse proves beyond a doubt that somebody had “resistance to the operations of the Spirit and the grace of God”.
So why would Christ be concerned about either their temporal well-being or their eternal well-being? The true answer is that Christ genuinely cared about both because God is interactive with us. But this is outside the bounds of monergism.
Q1: If God does not want evil, and evil occurs, then why did God, Almighty, all-knowing, and good, let that happen?
A: An illustration might help here. During the American Revolutionary War, a friend of George Washington’s was caught committing treason and sentenced to be executed. George Washington liked his friend, knew his friend was guilty, and could have intervened to try to save his friend. But even though George Washington did not want to see his friend die, George Washington did not intervene in the execution of the guilty man. God does not want us to make choices that go against Him, but apparently God often values the ability He gave us to make choices more than forcing us or our wills to be puppets.
Q2: Since God knows the future with certainty (not just predictability), doesn’t that certainty force our actions?
A: No, that does not logically follow, especially for a God who is outside of time. Let’s go back to George Washington again. Let’s say I read in a history book that George Washington crossed the Delaware River. I can know (at least with as much certainty as humanly possible) that George Washington did that. By my knowledge of that past event, did I somehow force George Washington to choose to cross the Delaware River? – Of course not. Now let’s say I could travel in a time machine to 1,000 years ago, and take the history book with me. Again, would my (as certain as possible) knowledge of that (future) event force George Washington to act a certain way? – Of course not.
Q3: How could God be in control if He allows things He does not want?
A: There are a number of good answers to this question, and they are not mutually exclusive.
Permissive Decrees: Charles Hodge of Princeton Theological Seminary, said, “God never decrees to do, or to cause others to do what He forbids. He may, as we see He does, decree to permit what He forbids. He permits men to sin, although sin is forbidden.” (Curt Daniel’s Dissert. p.230). In Chosen by God p.97 R.C. Sproul writes “[God] ordained the Fall in the sense that he chose to allow it, but not in the sense that he chose to coerce it.” Gordon Clark does not say that God either coerced it against their will, or merely allowed it, but rather that God made their will to want it.
In history, the idea that God appointed, for periods of time, permission for free-will was taught by Justin Martyr (c.138-165 A.D.) “But yet, since He [God] knew that it would be good, He created both angels and men free to do that which is righteous, and He appointed periods of time during which He knew it would be good for them to have the exercise of free-will; and because He likewise knew it would be good, He made general and particular judgments; each one's freedom of will, however, being guarded.” Dialogue with Trypho the Jew ch.102 p.251.
Dependent Decrees: God did not expressly decree everything independently. As W. D. Smith and Charles Hodge mention, while the working of good can produce evil reactions by evil men, the evil reactions are not chargeable to God, though God accounts for those too, in His plan.
Like a cosmic movie-maker, God expressly decreed a number of specific events and let the film roll. After previewing a number of “takes”, He decreed the take that pleased Him the most. If we are able to erase and edit videotapes as we please, cannot God do the same?
Concurrence: Louis Berkhof says, “Concurrence may be defined as the cooperation of the divine power with all subordinate powers, according to the pre-established laws of operation, causing them to act and to act precisely as they do.” Curt Daniel (p.201) adds “He acts in, with and under the things of Nature.”
In history, the idea of concurrence goes all the way back to Clement of Alexandria (197-217/220 A.D.) in talking about Pharaoh against Moses: “For He [God] shows both things: both His divinity in His foreknowledge of what would take place, and His love in affording an opportunity for repentance to the self-determination of the soul.” The Instructor book 1 ch.9 p.229
Conclusion: Perhaps the most marvelous of God’s decrees is a measure of freedom, with its corresponding accountability. While God does not desire, decree, or will evil directly, He permits evil (like dependent decrees) as an “existential parasite,” a part of his plan to accomplish His purposes, which include people who freely choose to love Him.
Q4: Did Augustine “add a theory of free will” as Clark’s book p.12 says?
A: It is true that Augustine believed and extensively discussed man’s free will, but Augustine did not “add” it because he was by no means the first Christian to teach on our free-will”. John Owen was of the opinion that Origen was the first to bring in free will, in A Display of Arminianism ch.12, but that is incorrect too. The term “free-will” goes back to at least as early as c.150 A.D.
Mathetes to Diognetus (130 A.D.) 2, 10. vol.1 p.25 (partial, because did not actually use the term “free-will”) “Come, then after you have freed [or purified] yourself from all prejudices possessing your mind” 1:29 “having been a disciple of the Apostles...”
Mathetes to Diognetus (130 A.D.) (partial) “as a Savior He sent Him, and as seeking to persuade, not to compel us; for violence has no place in the character of God.” chapter 7 p.27 Again, the writer does not use the term “free-will” but this sounds very Arminian to me.
Justin Martyr (c.150 A.D.) “And again, unless the human race have the power of avoiding evil and choosing good by free choice, they are not accountable for their actions, of whatever kind they be. But that it is by free choice they both walk uprightly and stumble, we thus demonstrate. … For not like other things, as trees and quadrupeds, which cannot act by choice, did God make man : for neither would he be worthy of reward or praised did he not of himself choose the good, but were created for this end; nor, if he were evil, would he be worthy of punishment, not being evil of himself, but being able to be nothing else than what he was made.” First Apology of Justin Martyr ch.43 p.177
Justin Martyr (c.150 A.D.) “So, too, Plato, when he says, ‘The blame is his who chooses, and God is blameless,’ took this from the prophet Moses and uttered it. For Moses is more ancient than all the Greek writers.” First Apology of Justin Martyr ch.44 p.177
Justin Martyr (c.150 A.D.) While the Stoics say fate, God made the angels and all men, with free will. Second Apology of Justin Martyr ch.7 p.190
Justin Martyr (c.138-165 A.D.) Jesus did not submit to be born and crucified because of his need, but because of the human race. God endowed both angels and men with free will. Dialogue with Trypho, a Jew ch.88 p.243
Justin Martyr (c.150 A.D.) God’s foretelling does not does not prove fatal necessity or nullify free will because God’s foretelling is through His foreknowledge. “The words cited above, David uttered 1500 years before Christ... But lest some suppose, from what has been said by us, that we say that whatever happens, happens by a fatal necessity, because it is foretold as known beforehand, this too we explain.” First Apology of Justin Martyr ch.44 p.177
Athenagoras (177 A.D.) “Just as with men, who have freedom of choice as to both virtue and vice (for you would not either honour the good or punish the bad, unless and vice and virtue were in their own power; and some are diligent in the matters entrusted to them by you, and others faithless), so is it among the angels. Some, free agents, you will observe,…” A Plea for Christians ch.24 p.142
Irenaeus of Lyons (182-188 A.D.) “all such have been created for the benefit of that human nature which is saved, ripening for immortality that which is [possessed] of its own free will and its own power” Irenaeus Against Heresies book 5 ch.24.1 p.558
Irenaeus of Lyons (182-188 A.D.) “And not merely in works, but also in faith, has God preserved the will of man free and under his own control, saying, ‘According to thy faith be it unto three;’ thus showing that there is a faith specially belonging to man, since he has an opinion specially his own.” Irenaeus Against Heresies book 4 ch.37.5 p.519-520
Clement of Alexandria (193-202 A.D.) “But since free choice and inclination originate sins, … punishments are rightly inflicted. For to take fever is involuntary, but when one takes fever through his own fault, from excess, we blame him.” Stromata book 1 ch.17 p.319
Tertullian (207/208 A.D.) “Therefore it was proper that (he who is) the image and likeness of God should be formed with a free will and a mastery of himself; so that this very thing-namely, freedom of will and self-command-might be reckoned as the image and likeness of God in him.” Five Books Against Marcion book 2 ch.6 p.301-302
Hippolytus of Portus (222-235/236 A.D.) “Since man has free will, a law has been defined for his guidance by the Deity, not without answering a good purpose.” Refutation of All Heresies book 10 ch.29 p.151
Hippolytus of Portus (222-235/236 A.D.) (implied, self-determination) “[Jesus] might exhibit His own manhood as an aim for all men. And that by Himself in person He might prove that God made nothing evil, and that man possesses the capacity of self-determination, inasmuch as he is able to will and not to will, and is endued with the power to do both.” Refutation of All Heresies book 10 ch.29 p.152. See also ibid p.151 in two places.
Theodotus the probable Montanist (ca.240 A.D.) “Wherefore God has endowed the soul with free choice, that He may show it its duty, and that it choosing, may receive and retain.” Excerpts of Theodotus ch.21 p.45
Origen (225-253/254 A.D.) believed in free will for each individual in Origen Against Celsus book 5 ch.21 p.552. While Origen was most unfortunately a universalist, a large number of Christians after Origen respected him. The Council of Chalcedon in 451 A.D. anathematized him though.
Origen (233/234 A.D.) mentions our free will in Origen’s Exhortation to Martyrdom ch.10 p.149
Origen (233/234 A.D.) discusses free will in Origen On Prayer ch.6.2 p.31-33
Novatian (250/4-256/7 A.D.) “He [God] laid down a command, in which man was taught that there was no evil in the fruit of the tree; but he was forewarned that evil would arise if perchance he should exercise his free will, in the contempt of the law that was given. For, on the one hand, it had behooved him to be free, lest the image of God should unfittingly be in bondage; and on the other, the law was to be added, so that aa unbridled liberty might not break forth even to a contempt of the Giver. So that he might receive as a consequence both worthy rewards and a deserved punishment, having in his own power that which he might chose to do, by the tendency of his mind in either direction:” Concerning the Trinity ch.1 p.612
Cyprian of Carthage (c.246-258 A.D.) “since they might have retained by their own right what now by a necessity, which they of their own free will have sought, they are compelled, they are compelled to sue for.” Epistles of Cyprian Epistle 25 ch.7 p.305
Adamantius (c.300 A.D.) “Evil does not arise as a part of the nature, essence or substance of being, but by means of free will.” Dialogue on the True Faith Fourth Part ch.9 p.137. See also First part ch.821c p.75 and also fourth para. ch.11 p.142.
Adamantius (c.300 A.D.) “However, I am going to show from the Gospel that Christ is speaking of men possessing free will, and not of principles!” Then he quotes Matthew 7:15-16; Luke 6:45; Matthew 5:19. (Adamantius is speaking) Dialogue on the True Faith first part ch.821.c p.75
Alexander of Lycopolis (301 A.D.) “But man, being able to perceive and to judge, and being potentially wise, -for he has the power to become so -when he has received what is peculiar to himself, treads it under foot.” Of the Manichaeans chap.15 (vol.6) p.247
Arnobius of Sicca (297-303 A.D.) “I [Arnobius] reply, does not He free all alike who invites all alike? Or does He thrust back or repel any one from the kindness of the Supreme who gives to all alike the power of coming to Him,-to men of high rank, to the meanest slaves, to women, to boys? To all, He says, the fountain of life is open, and no one is hindered or kept back from drinking. If you are so fastidious as to spurn the kindly offered gift, nay, more, if your wisdom is so great that you term those things which are offered by Christ ridiculous and absurd, why should He keep on inviting you, while His only duty is to make the enjoyment of His bounty depend upon your own free choice?” Arnobius Against the Heathen book 2 ch.64 p.458
Arnobius of Sicca (297-303 A.D.) “Nay, my opponent says, if God is powerful, merciful, willing to save us, let Him change our dispositions, and compel us to trust in His promises. This, then is violence, not kindness nor the bounty of the Supreme God, but a childish and vain strife in seeking to get the mastery. For what is so unjust as to force men who are reluctant and unwilling, to reverse their inclinations, to impress forcibly on their minds what they are unwilling to receive,” Against the Heathen 2:64,65. p.459
Methodius of Olympus (270-311/312 A.D.) says that if someone says man does not have free will but is governed by unavoidable necessities of fate, then they are impious against God, making him the cause and author of human evils. The Banquet of the Ten Virgins discourse 8 ch.16 p.342
Methodius of Olympus (270-311/312 A.D.) vol.6 p.356-363 wrote an entire work called Concerning Free Will. As an aside, Methodius was quite critical of Origen.
Athanasius of Alexandria (318 A.D.) says the soul departed from Truth by abuse of freedom of choice. Against the Heathen ch.1 p.5-6
Lactantius (c.303-320/325 A.D.) “For if you wish to defend religion by bloodshed, and by tortures, and by guilt, it will no longer be defended, but will be polluted and profaned. For nothing is so much a matter of free-will as religion; in which, if the mind of the worshipper is disinclined to it, religion is at once taken away, and ceases to exist.” The Divine Institutes book 5 ch.20 p.157
Lactantius (c.303-320/325 A.D.) (partial) “And yet He [God] set before him [man] both good and evil things, inasmuch as He gave to him wisdom, the whole nature of which is employed in discerning things evil and good: for no one can choose better things, and know what is good, unless he at the same time knows to reject and avoid the things which are evil.” Treatise on the Anger of God ch.13 p.271
Eusebius of Caesarea (c.318-325 A.D.) “But further, this opinion would overthrow piety towards deity, if, fettered as we are by the necessities of fate, neither God Himself, nor the minister of these oracular gods give us any help either in answer to our prayers or for our piety. And would it not be most shameless and impudent to say that we are moved like lifeless puppets pulled by strings this way and that by some external power, to will of necessity to do this or that, and to choose other things against our will? For we plainly feel ourselves desiring this or that by our own impulses and motion, and again we take ourselves to task for carelessness, and feel that we succeed or not from this cause, and suffer no compulsion from any external source, but choose some things by voluntary determination, and shun and decline others of our own deliberate purpose. So evident therefore is the argument for free-will.., Preparation for the Gospel book 6 ch.6 p.10
Eusebius of Caesarea (c.318-315 A.D.) “For God made neither nature nor yet the substance of the soul evil: since a good Being may not create anything but what is good. Everything, then, that is according to nature is good: and every rational soul possesses by nature the good gift of free-will, which has been given for choosing what is good.” Preparation for the Gospel book 6 ch.6 p.14
As an aside, Pre-Nicene Christians were very comfortable talking about election too; they saw no difficulty talking about both election and free-will.